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International Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning
Publisher's Home Page: https://www.svedbergopen.com/
Research Paper Open Access

Intelligent Data Contamination Prevention Framework For AI Training Data Poisoning Detection And Mitigation

Muneer Basha Shaik[1], Anitha Velde[2]

Independent Researcher, USA[1,2]
ORCID : 0009-0009-6750-9649
Email Id :reachme.muneer@gmail.com

Abstract
The integrity of training data stands as a foundational requirement for trustworthy artificial intelligence systems deployed at enterprise scale. As organizations integrate machine learning into high-stakes decision processes — spanning fraud detection, clinical decision support, and autonomous systems — the attack surface has shifted from model architecture to data supply chains. This paper presents the Intelligent Data Contamination Prevention (IDCP) Framework, a multi-layer defensive architecture designed to detect and mitigate data poisoning attacks across enterprise AI training pipelines. The threat landscape addressed includes clean-label attacks [5], backdoor and trojan injection [7][4], gradient-matching poisoning [12], federated learning vulnerabilities [15], and concealed natural language processing (NLP) poisoning [6]. The IDCP Framework operates across three coordinated layers: a Data Ingestion and Provenance Layer that enforces cryptographic lineage tracking, a Statistical Anomaly Detection Layer that applies gradient-space analysis, spectral signatures, and ensemble voting, and a Behavioral Validation Layer that uses activation clustering, perturbation-based consistency testing, and reverse-engineering scans of model checkpoints. The framework contribution is architectural: an integrated, pipeline-agnostic design that synthesizes published detection methods into a unified enterprise defense. The framework aligns with NIST AI 100-2 [10] and incorporates automated Datasheets for Datasets [21] generation, providing a standards-compliant governance path for regulated industries.

Keywords: data poisoning, backdoor attacks, adversarial machine learning, AI security, training data integrity, activation clustering, enterprise AI governance.

1. Introduction

Enterprise AI systems now depend on curated datasets of unprecedented scale and diversity. A financial fraud detection model may train on hundreds of millions of transactions; a clinical NLP system may ingest decades of electronic health records. This data dependency, once treated as an engineering concern, has become a primary security surface. Adversaries who cannot breach a deployed model through inference-time attacks can instead compromise the data pipeline that shaped it — embedding persistent vulnerabilities that survive model deployment, versioning, and even retraining cycles. Biggio and Roli's survey of adversarial machine learning [3] documents how this threat category has matured over a decade from theoretical curiosity to documented attack methodology.

Data poisoning attacks manipulate training sets to produce models that behave correctly on standard test distributions while failing in attacker-specified ways on trigger inputs [3][4]. The failure mode is particularly dangerous because it is undetectable through conventional model evaluation: a backdoored model passes accuracy benchmarks, satisfies validation suites, and clears A/B tests — only manifesting adversarial behavior when a specific trigger pattern appears at inference time. Goodfellow et al. [1] observe that the depth of neural

network representations, precisely the property that enables generalization, also enables the encoding of hidden behaviors that standard evaluation cannot surface.

The poisoning taxonomy divides broadly into targeted and indiscriminate attacks. Targeted attacks, which include clean-label poisoning [5] and backdoor injection [7], cause misclassification on specific inputs while preserving general accuracy. Clean-label attacks are especially insidious: the injected samples carry correct labels and appear visually plausible, yet their feature-space representations are crafted to push class boundaries toward the attacker's chosen misclassification target. Backdoor attacks, as characterized by Chen et al. [4] and formalized by Gu et al. [7], embed a trigger pattern — a pixel patch, a typographic token, a spectral watermark — whose presence activates a hidden classification rule. Indiscriminate attacks, by contrast, aim to degrade overall model performance rather than route specific inputs to chosen outputs. Wallace et al. [6] extend this taxonomy to NLP, demonstrating token-level manipulation that survives standard preprocessing pipelines. Vorobeychik and Kantarcioglu [2] provide a comprehensive theoretical treatment of the adversarial machine learning landscape that frames these attacks within a formal threat model.

Existing defenses address pieces of this problem but not its totality. Certified defenses [11] provide provable guarantees under bounded perturbations but do not scale to industrial training runs. Activation clustering [16] identifies backdoor-poisoned samples by separating their internal representations from clean data, but becomes computationally prohibitive at dataset scales above tens of millions of samples without careful engineering. Runtime defenses like STRIP [18] and post-hoc analysis via Neural Cleanse [19] operate after training, leaving the training process itself unprotected. No published framework integrates detection across all pipeline stages — ingestion, training, and model validation — in a manner compatible with the MLOps infrastructure used by enterprise AI teams.

This paper addresses that gap. The contribution is the IDCP Framework — a modular, pipeline-agnostic defense architecture that integrates provenance tracking, statistical anomaly detection, and behavioral validation into a single orchestrated system. The framework is designed for compatibility with PyTorch, TensorFlow, and enterprise MLOps platforms, and its governance outputs align with NIST AI 100-2 [10] and the Datasheets for Datasets standard [21]. Section 2 reviews the threat taxonomy and related defenses in detail. Section 3 describes the three-layer IDCP architecture. Section 4 presents a framework component analysis grounded in published experimental evidence. Sections 5 and 6 discuss implications and conclusions.

2. Background and Related Work

2.1 Threat Taxonomy

Clean-label attacks, introduced by Shafahi et al. [5], represent the most difficult detection challenge in the data poisoning landscape. The attacker modifies training samples through imperceptible perturbations in input space — perturbations that preserve human-readable labels and visual plausibility — while dramatically altering the sample's position in the feature space learned by the target model. Because the labels are correct and the images appear unmodified to visual inspection, standard data quality checks fail to detect them. The perturbations are computed to push the poisoned sample's representation toward a chosen target class, causing the model to learn a distorted decision boundary that misclassifies the target instance at inference time.

Backdoor and trojan attacks embed a trigger pattern into a subset of training samples and associate that trigger with a chosen misclassification target [7][4]. Gu et al. [7] demonstrated that a sticker-sized patch trigger applied to traffic sign images, inserted into as few as 10% of training samples, produces a reliable backdoor while preserving clean-image accuracy to within 0.17% of the baseline — a finding that illustrates why standard accuracy metrics cannot detect poisoning. The error rate on backdoored images, by contrast, falls to at most 0.09% for the single-target attack, confirming near-perfect trigger activation [7]. Li et al. [14] extended this to steganographic triggers invisible to human inspection. The practical implication for enterprise deployments is that a compromised data supplier — or a malicious insider with write access to a training dataset — can embed a persistent trigger with significant effect on a targeted class.

In NLP settings, Wallace et al. [6] demonstrated that inserting short trigger phrases into as few as 0.1% of training documents reliably manipulates model predictions while remaining undetected by standard text quality filters. The attack exploits the sensitivity of attention-based language models to specific lexical patterns.

Federated learning introduces an additional vector: Bagdasaryan et al. [15] showed that a single malicious participant in a federated training round can inject a backdoor that survives federated averaging, because the aggregation mechanism cannot distinguish a well-crafted poisoned update from legitimate gradient contributions.

Gradient-matching attacks, as developed by Geiping et al. [12], represent the industrial frontier of data poisoning. The attacker crafts poisoned samples whose training gradients closely match a chosen target gradient trajectory, causing the model to learn attacker-specified behaviors without the distributional anomalies that statistical detectors are designed to surface. Geiping et al. demonstrate successful targeted attacks achieving an average poison success rate of 90.00% (±3.87%) against a ResNet-18 trained from scratch on CIFAR-10 with a poison budget of 1% of the training set [12] — confirming that gradient-matching constitutes a credible and scalable threat and motivating the need for gradient-space monitoring.

2.2 Existing Defenses and Their Limitations

Steinhardt et al. [11] formalized certified defenses for data poisoning, proving that models trained with data sanitization procedures can maintain bounded accuracy loss under adversarial poisoning. However, their approach assumes access to a clean reference distribution and requires solving a computationally expensive optimization problem at scale — practical for datasets of tens of thousands of samples but intractable for datasets in the hundreds of millions that characterize production enterprise AI pipelines.

Activation clustering, proposed by Chen et al. [16], exploits the observation that backdoor-poisoned samples produce systematically different activation patterns at the final hidden layer compared to clean samples from the same class. K-means clustering on these activations reliably separates poisoned from clean samples across tested poison rates. The limitation is computational: computing full penultimate-layer activations for a 100-million-sample training set requires substantial GPU infrastructure and adds materially to training wall-clock time if not carefully batched.

STRIP [18] operates at inference time rather than during training. It perturbs incoming inputs by superimposing random clean images and measures the entropy of the resulting prediction distribution. Poisoned inputs carrying backdoor triggers show anomalously low prediction entropy — the trigger overrides the perturbation and produces confident predictions regardless of the superimposed content. While effective, STRIP protects deployed models rather than training pipelines; a poisoned model must first be deployed before STRIP can operate.

Neural Cleanse [19] takes a reverse-engineering approach: it reconstructs potential trigger patterns by optimizing for the smallest perturbation that causes misclassification to each class, then uses anomaly detection on the resulting perturbation norms to identify backdoor targets. The method is effective but carries high computational overhead — optimizing a reverse-engineered trigger for each output class in a 1000-class model requires thousands of optimization steps per class. SPECTRE [13] applies robust statistical estimation to representation-space data to identify clusters of anomalous samples without requiring trigger reconstruction, but assumes identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) clean data — an assumption that fails in federated and multi-source enterprise datasets.

The collective gap across these defenses is the absence of an integrated framework. Each method operates at a specific pipeline stage, requires specific architectural assumptions, and optimizes for a specific attack type. Enterprise AI pipelines need defense-in-depth: no single detector is sufficient against an adaptive adversary [17].

3. The IDCP Framework

3.1 Framework Overview

The IDCP Framework is organized into three coordinated defensive layers: the Data Ingestion and Provenance Layer, the Statistical Anomaly Detection Layer, and the Behavioral Validation Layer. Each layer targets a distinct stage of the training pipeline, and each layer's outputs feed into a centralized quarantine and audit system. The three-layer design reflects the core insight that no single detection method defeats the full range of poisoning attacks; effective enterprise defense requires defense-in-depth across the data lifecycle.

The framework is pipeline-agnostic by design. Integration adapters expose a common API compatible with PyTorch DataLoader hooks, TensorFlow tf.data pipeline interception, and the metadata APIs of major MLOps platforms including MLflow and Kubeflow. Training teams instrument their existing pipelines without restructuring model training code. Governance integration is built in rather than bolted on: the framework automatically generates Datasheets for Datasets [21] entries per training batch, emits SIEM-compatible alert events, and maps all detected anomalies to the NIST AI 100-2 [10] attack-mitigation taxonomy.

Figure 1. Intelligent Data Contamination Prevention (IDCP) Framework Architecture

3.2 Layer 1 — Data Ingestion and Provenance

The Data Ingestion and Provenance Layer operates at the point where data enters the training pipeline. Its primary function is to establish and maintain a cryptographically verifiable record of every data point's origin, transformation history, and current integrity status. This layer catches supply-chain attacks — compromised upstream data sources, malicious data augmentation pipelines, and insider manipulation — that ML-layer defenses cannot detect because the manipulation occurs before training data reaches the model.

At ingestion, each data batch receives a SHA-256 hash chain entry that binds the batch contents to the preceding batch's hash, creating an append-only tamper-evident log analogous to a blockchain ledger but without the distributed consensus overhead. Per-sample lineage records capture source URI, acquisition timestamp, contributor identity, and the sequence of preprocessing transforms applied. Any modification to a registered sample after its initial hash registration is detectable through hash comparison at training time.

Automated quality gates apply distribution shift detection using Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between the current batch's feature distribution and a rolling clean-data reference distribution, flagging batches whose divergence exceeds a configurable threshold — typically set at three standard deviations above the historical mean. Source concentration anomalies — sudden increases in the fraction of samples from a single contributor — are detected via entropy analysis of the source distribution. Label-feature inconsistencies, where a sample's label conflicts with its feature-space position relative to labeled class centroids, trigger a review flag aligned with the clean-label detection approach of Shafahi et al. [5]. The automated quality verification approach draws on the large-scale data quality methods described by Schelter et al. [22].



Figure 2. Enterprise AI Training Pipeline with Defense-in-Depth

3.3 Layer 2 — Statistical Anomaly Detection

The Statistical Anomaly Detection Layer operates during training, monitoring the model's gradient behavior and representation space for statistical signatures associated with poisoned samples. Three detection signals operate in parallel, with an ensemble voting mechanism that flags samples only when a configured minimum number of signals agree — reducing false positives relative to any single detector operating alone.

Gradient-space analysis monitors per-sample gradient norms during the training forward-backward pass. Poisoned samples — particularly those crafted via gradient-matching methods [12] — often produce gradient norms that deviate from the distribution established by clean samples, even when the attacker has specifically optimized to minimize this deviation. The IDCP Framework maintains a sliding window gradient norm distribution and flags samples whose gradient norms fall beyond 3.5 standard deviations from the window mean. Flagged samples are quarantined from the current training batch and reviewed by the provenance audit system.

Spectral signature detection applies robust principal component analysis (PCA) to the model's representation space — specifically to the penultimate layer activations — at configurable checkpoints during training. The method is motivated by the SPECTRE defense [13], extended to handle non-i.i.d. multi-source data through source-stratified robust estimation. Clustering anomalies in the spectral decomposition indicate the presence of samples whose representations form a statistically coherent subgroup — a signature consistent with backdoor injection, where a set of trigger-bearing samples cluster together in activation space despite spanning multiple apparent input categories.

Feature-centroid distance analysis computes, for each training sample, the distance between the sample's penultimate-layer representation and the centroid of its labeled class, flagging samples that are statistically distant from their label's class centroid as clean-label poisoning candidates [5]. The threshold is calibrated during a clean warmup phase using held-out verified-clean data from the provenance layer. Ensemble voting requires at least two of the three statistical signals to flag a sample before it is quarantined, a design choice that reduces false positives at the cost of marginally reduced sensitivity to attacks that produce weak signals in two or more detectors.

3.4 Layer 3 — Behavioral Validation

The Behavioral Validation Layer applies the computationally intensive behavioral analysis methods after training, operating on model checkpoints rather than individual samples. This placement reflects a practical engineering judgment: full activation clustering and reverse-engineering scans are too expensive to run on every sample during training but are tractable when applied to model checkpoints and the flagged candidate samples surfaced by Layers 1 and 2.

Activation clustering [16] operates on the penultimate layer activations of the trained model checkpoint, evaluated on the full training dataset. K-means clustering with k=2 within each class separates the two largest clusters; a cluster whose size as a fraction of the class population falls below a configurable minimum threshold is flagged as potentially poisoned. This approach is grounded in the near-perfect detection accuracy and F1 scores that Chen et al. [16] report on MNIST at a 10% poison rate, substantially outperforming raw-input clustering (58.6% accuracy and 15.8% F1 score at 10% poison rate [16]).

STRIP-inspired consistency testing [18] evaluates candidate flagged samples by superimposing each candidate with randomly selected clean samples and measuring prediction entropy across 100 superimposition trials. Clean samples show high entropy — the superimposed content meaningfully shifts predictions — while samples carrying backdoor triggers show anomalously low entropy, as the trigger pattern dominates prediction regardless of superimposed content. The entropy threshold for flagging is calibrated per model architecture during a clean reference evaluation phase.

Reverse-engineering scanning adapts the Neural Cleanse methodology [19] to the checkpoint review context. Rather than scanning all output classes, the IDCP Framework applies targeted reverse engineering to the output classes flagged by activation clustering, reducing per-scan computational cost by an average factor equal to the number of unflagged classes. Reconstructed trigger candidates whose anomaly index — the ratio of their L1 norm to the median L1 norm across all classes — exceeds 2.0 are reported as confirmed backdoor targets.

Adaptive attack resistance is a deliberate design priority. Tramèr et al. [17] demonstrate that defenses optimized against specific known attacks are systematically vulnerable to adaptive adversaries who tailor their attacks to evade detection. The IDCP Framework addresses this through ensemble design: an adaptive attacker who defeats the gradient-space detector by minimizing gradient norm deviation still faces spectral signature detection and activation clustering. Defeating all three statistical detectors simultaneously while also evading Layer 1 provenance tracking requires an attack complexity substantially higher than any published method as of this writing.

3.5 Governance and Compliance Integration

Enterprise AI deployments operate within regulatory frameworks that increasingly mandate data provenance and model auditability. The IDCP Framework generates Datasheets for Datasets [21] entries automatically for

each training batch, recording composition, collection process, preprocessing, and the results of IDCP screening — providing the documentation artifacts required for AI governance reviews without manual overhead.

A membership inference audit layer [20], adapted from Shokri et al.'s attack methodology, detects whether the model has inadvertently memorized poisoned samples that evaded earlier detection stages. Samples that the model can identify as training members with high confidence — indicating memorization rather than generalization — are flagged for human review. SIEM platform integration exports quarantine events, alert escalations, and batch disposition records to enterprise security monitoring infrastructure in real time. All framework controls are mapped to the NIST AI 100-2 [10] taxonomy of attacks and mitigations, enabling compliance teams to demonstrate coverage against the standard's enumerated threat categories.

4. Framework Component Analysis and Design Rationale

The IDCP Framework's architecture is grounded in published experimental evidence rather than constructed a priori. Each defensive layer is motivated by specific empirical findings from the literature that quantify both the effectiveness and the limits of individual detection methods. This section documents the evidence base for each layer's design, maps the framework's coverage to the attack-specific behavior documented in published work, and identifies the scope limitations that constrain the framework's current applicability.

4.1 Evidence Base for Layer Design Choices

The Layer 1 provenance and ingestion design is motivated by a gap that pure ML-layer defenses leave unaddressed: supply-chain attacks that corrupt data before it reaches the training system. Statistical and behavioral detectors operating on training-time signals cannot detect poisoning that occurs upstream of the pipeline they monitor. The automated data quality verification methods of Schelter et al. [22] demonstrate that large-scale data quality gates can surface distributional anomalies — including unexpected source shifts and feature distribution changes — at pipeline ingestion, providing a detection opportunity unavailable to in-training methods.

Layer 2's statistical anomaly detection ensemble is grounded in SPECTRE [13], which reports detection performance on CIFAR-10 as area under the ROC curve (AUROC): 0.895 for BadNets attacks, 0.931 for Trojan attacks, and 0.765 for Blend attacks [13]. These results reveal a critical design implication: no single spectral or robust-statistics detector achieves uniformly high performance across all attack types. The Blend attack's lower AUROC of 0.765 [13] reflects the difficulty of detecting steganographic and blended triggers that distribute poisoning signals diffusely across the representation space rather than concentrating them in a separable cluster. This variability is the primary justification for the ensemble voting architecture of Layer 2 — a single spectral method leaves a meaningful detection gap against blended attacks that an ensemble combining gradient-space analysis and feature-centroid distance analysis can partially close.

Layer 3's behavioral validation, anchored in activation clustering [16], is supported by the most direct experimental evidence for the approach's efficacy. Chen et al. report near-perfect detection on MNIST with 10% poisoned data: approximately 100% detection accuracy and F1 score across all tested classes [16]. On the LISA traffic sign dataset — a more practically realistic scenario — activation clustering achieved 100% accuracy and F1 when either 33% or 15% of the stop sign class was poisoned [16]. By contrast, clustering applied to raw input representations rather than penultimate-layer activations achieved only 58.6% accuracy and 15.8% F1 at a 10% poison rate on the same datasets [16]. This comparison is the core empirical argument for operating activation clustering in representation space rather than input space: the difference between 58.6% and approximately 100% detection accuracy is the contribution of learned representations to separating poisoned from clean samples.

4.2 Attack-Specific Defense Coverage

BadNets backdoor attacks [7] present a detection challenge that accuracy monitoring alone cannot address. Gu et al. document that a backdoored model trained on traffic sign images with a sticker-sized trigger achieves an average clean accuracy comparable to the baseline while (mis)classifying more than 90% of backdoored stop signs as speed-limit signs — with a clean accuracy drop of at most 0.17% on the non-backdoored validation set [7]. Standard validation metrics therefore provide no reliable signal. The IDCP Framework's Layer 3 activation clustering is specifically designed to surface this gap: the penultimate-layer representation of trigger-bearing samples forms a coherent minority cluster within each class, detectable through the k-means separation that Chen et al. [16] demonstrate at high accuracy on both MNIST and LISA.

Gradient-matching attacks (Witches' Brew [12]) present a different challenge. Geiping et al. demonstrate an average poison success rate of 90.00% (±3.87%) against a ResNet-18 trained from scratch on CIFAR-10 with a 1% poison budget [12], crafting poisoned samples whose gradient distributions closely match clean training

gradients. This deliberate gradient camouflage is designed to defeat gradient-norm monitoring in isolation. The IDCP Framework's Layer 2 response is an ensemble: gradient-norm monitoring is combined with spectral signature detection operating in representation space — a signal that gradient-matching optimization does not directly suppress — and with Layer 1 provenance tracking that operates upstream of any gradient-based signal.

Clean-label attacks [5] do not modify sample labels, making them invisible to label-consistency checks — the most commonly deployed data quality filter. The poisoning is encoded entirely in imperceptible feature-space perturbations. Layer 2's feature-centroid distance analysis specifically targets this structure: samples whose penultimate-layer representations are statistically displaced from their labeled class centroid produce elevated distance scores even when their labels and visual content appear legitimate. This detection approach is complementary to activation clustering and addresses an attack class that the Layer 3 k-means approach is less well positioned to catch at very low poison rates.

Federated learning backdoor attacks [15] introduce a structural challenge that in-training detectors cannot fully address: the poisoning originates at distributed training clients whose data is not directly visible to the central aggregator. Layer 1's provenance tracking addresses this by maintaining source attribution at the contributor level — tracking which federated participant contributed which training updates and flagging source concentration anomalies when a single contributor's updates account for a disproportionate fraction of a flagged class's training signal. This supply-chain-level visibility is the only IDCP layer with a direct structural response to federated poisoning.

4.3 Limitations and Scope

The IDCP Framework's component designs are individually validated against published benchmarks. End-to-end framework evaluation on enterprise production pipelines — including the interaction effects between layers, threshold calibration under real-world class imbalance, and performance against adaptive attackers with knowledge of all three detection layers — constitutes necessary future work before deployment performance can be formally characterized.

SPECTRE's AUROC of 0.765 on Blend attacks [13] is the clearest quantitative signal of the multi-layer design's necessity. Steganographic and blended triggers that distribute poisoning signals diffusely across the representation space remain the hardest detection challenge in the current literature. No published single-method defense achieves high detection rates across all attack types simultaneously — BadNets, Trojan, Blend, clean-label, and gradient-matching attacks each require different detection signals. The IDCP's ensemble architecture is a direct architectural response to this gap: requiring simultaneous evasion of three independent detection layers increases adaptive attack complexity multiplicatively.

Certified defenses [11] provide provable robustness guarantees but with computational costs that scale poorly with dataset size — a key limitation that motivates the IDCP's practical multi-layer design. The framework deliberately trades formal certification for practical deployability across enterprise-scale pipelines, accepting a probabilistic rather than provable security guarantee as the operational trade-off.

Adaptive attackers who tailor their attacks to known defenses can degrade any individual detection method [17]. The ensemble architecture mitigates this risk by requiring an attacker to simultaneously satisfy the constraints needed to evade gradient-norm monitoring, spectral clustering, activation clustering, and Layer 1 provenance tracking — a composite constraint that grows substantially harder than evading any single method. However, a sufficiently resourced adaptive adversary with full framework knowledge remains a meaningful threat. Long-term security requires periodic rotation of detection thresholds and ensemble composition to prevent optimization against a fixed known configuration.



Figure 3. Data Poisoning Attack vs Defense Coverage Matrix

5. Discussion

The IDCP Framework's multi-layer architecture directly addresses the fragmentation problem documented in Section 2. Prior defenses occupy specific niches in the attack-defense landscape; the IDCP Framework connects those niches into a unified pipeline. The practical significance of this integration is architectural rather than merely additive: the framework's ensemble voting and cross-layer information sharing enable detection coverage across attack classes that no individual component addresses comprehensively. The most direct evidence for this comes from the published literature: SPECTRE's AUROC of 0.765 on Blend attacks [13] versus 0.895 on BadNets and 0.931 on Trojan attacks [13] demonstrates that each statistical method has an attack-specific blind spot, and activation clustering's detection accuracy drops from approximately 100% to 58.6% when applied to raw inputs rather than learned representations [16] — underscoring that the combination of representation-space analysis with statistical ensemble methods addresses gaps that neither approach closes independently.

The provenance layer deserves particular emphasis because it is the most commonly overlooked component of data security in enterprise AI deployments. Most published defenses focus on the statistical properties of training samples, implicitly assuming that the data pipeline itself is trustworthy. Layer 1 explicitly rejects this assumption and provides the only defense layer capable of detecting supply-chain attacks where the poisoning occurs upstream of the training system — a threat vector that becomes increasingly relevant as organizations rely on third-party data vendors and open-source dataset repositories. The automated quality verification framework of Schelter et al. [22] provides the practical foundation for this capability at enterprise dataset scale.

The framework's architectural novelty lies in the integration of three independently motivated defense paradigms — provenance tracking, statistical anomaly detection, and behavioral validation — into a single pipeline-agnostic design that operates continuously across the full training lifecycle. Gradient-matching attacks

that achieve an average poison success rate of 90.00% (±3.87%) against undefended ResNet-18 pipelines on CIFAR-10 [12] motivate the gradient-space monitoring in Layer 2; the near-perfect activation clustering detection rates on MNIST and LISA [16] anchor the Layer 3 behavioral validation approach; and the variability of spectral detection across attack types [13] justifies the ensemble design over reliance on any single method.
Governance integration addresses a dimension of enterprise AI security that purely technical defenses leave open. The NIST AI RMF [10] provides the vocabulary for AI risk requirements across U.S. regulatory contexts; the European Union AI Act's high-risk AI system requirements and sector-specific regulations in finance and healthcare are converging on data provenance and model auditability as baseline requirements. The IDCP Framework operationalizes these requirements as executable pipeline controls rather than documentation artifacts. Datasheets for Datasets [21] generation provides the human-readable documentation that governance reviews require; the membership inference audit layer [20] surfaces privacy risks associated with model memorization, complementing security-oriented detection with a privacy assurance function relevant to GDPR and CCPA compliance.
Several limitations bound the framework's current applicability. Overhead analysis — the computational cost of running three coordinated detection layers across enterprise-scale training pipelines — requires empirical characterization in production environments; architectural choices such as behavioral validation frequency can be tuned to trade detection thoroughness for computational cost, but the optimal configuration depends on dataset scale, model architecture, and training infrastructure that varies across deployments. Real-time and online learning pipelines present a structural challenge: full behavioral validation on model checkpoints is designed for batch training cycles and is not directly applicable to systems that retrain continuously on streaming data. White-box adaptive adversaries with full knowledge of the detection ensemble remain an open challenge, as documented by Tramèr et al. [17]; periodic rotation of detection parameters and ensemble composition is the practical mitigation, but its effectiveness against sophisticated adaptive attackers requires further empirical study. No single published defense achieves high detection across all attack types simultaneously — the IDCP's ensemble approach is a direct architectural response to this gap, not a claim that the gap is fully closed.

6. Conclusion

This paper presented the Intelligent Data Contamination Prevention Framework — a three-layer defensive architecture for detecting and mitigating data poisoning attacks in enterprise AI training pipelines. The framework addresses the full poisoning lifecycle: Layer 1 enforces cryptographic provenance tracking and distribution-shift detection at data ingestion; Layer 2 applies gradient-space analysis, spectral signatures, and ensemble voting during training; and Layer 3 executes activation clustering, perturbation consistency testing, and reverse-engineering scans on model checkpoints after training. The three layers operate in concert, sharing detection signals and feeding a centralized quarantine and audit system.
The framework contribution is architectural: an integrated, pipeline-agnostic design that synthesizes published detection methods into a unified enterprise defense. The component designs are grounded in published experimental results: activation clustering [16] achieves near-perfect detection accuracy on MNIST and LISA at poison rates of 10 to 33%, substantially outperforming raw-input clustering (58.6% accuracy and 15.8% F1 at 10% poison rate [16]); SPECTRE [13] reports AUROC of 0.895 on BadNets and 0.931 on Trojan attacks but 0.765 on Blend attacks, demonstrating the variability that motivates the multi-layer ensemble; and gradient-matching attacks [12] achieve an average poison success rate of 90.00% (±3.87%) against undefended ResNet-18 pipelines on CIFAR-10, establishing the threat severity that Layer 2 gradient-space monitoring is designed to address.
The IDCP Framework contributes a first integrated architecture that combines provenance tracking, statistical detection, and behavioral validation in a single pipeline-agnostic design. This integration, aligned with NIST AI 100-2 [10] and Datasheets for Datasets [21], provides enterprise AI governance teams with a practical, standards-compliant data integrity assurance path at a time when regulatory requirements for AI trustworthiness are tightening across jurisdictions. As data poisoning attacks grow more sophisticated — particularly gradient-matching and adaptive attack variants — no single-method defense will suffice. The ensemble architecture principle demonstrated by the IDCP Framework points toward the necessary direction for the field.
Future work will address three open challenges: adaptation of the framework to real-time streaming training pipelines where full behavioral validation is computationally infeasible; a federated IDCP variant that distributes provenance tracking and statistical detection across federated training clients without exposing

per-client data to the aggregator; and end-to-end empirical evaluation of the integrated framework on enterprise production pipelines to characterize performance, overhead, and adaptive attack resistance under realistic deployment conditions.

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