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## Emergence of One-Party States in Africa, Tanzania and Burkina Faso in Perspective

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### Abstract

The emergence of one-party states in Burkina Faso and Tanzania was a significant political phenomenon in Africa during the post-colonial era. Both countries gained independence from their European colonizers in the early 1960s and subsequently established one-party systems of government as a means of promoting national unity, stability, and development, but it also had significant drawbacks, including the suppression of political pluralism and democratic participation. In Burkina Faso, the establishment of a one-party state was a result of a series of political crises and coups, and its first president, Maurice Yaméogo, established the Voltaic Democratic Union (UDV) as the ruling party. However, Yaméogo's authoritarian rule and his attempts to amend the constitution to extend his term in office led to widespread protests and a military coup in 1966. The military junta established a new political party, the National Liberation Council (CNL), which was later replaced by the Popular Democratic Party (PDP) in 1970. The PDP was the only legal political party in Burkina Faso until 1991 when a popular uprising led to the establishment of a multi-party democracy. In Tanzania, the establishment of a one-party state was a deliberate policy of the country's first president, Julius Nyerere who believed that a one-party system was necessary to promote national unity and prevent tribalism, which he saw as a major obstacle to development. The emergence of one-party states in Burkina Faso and Tanzania had both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, it provided political stability and allowed for the implementation of development programs. It also stifled political pluralism and democratic participation, leading to corruption, human rights abuses, and economic stagnation. The research examined the emergence of one-party states in Burkina Faso and Tanzania, with a particular focus on the political, social, and economic factors that contributed to their establishment and maintenance. The paper also explored the consequences of one-party rule for these countries and their people, and the factors that led to their eventual transition to multi-party democracy.

**Keywords:** *Burkina Faso, Tanzania, One-party, Nyerere, Compaoré, Political stability*

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### 1. Introduction

The emergence of one-party states on the African continent began after political independence from colonialism. The phenomenon was witnessed on the continent in the 1960s and was largely influenced by the decolonization process that swept across the continent. The newly independent African states faced numerous challenges in nation-building

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requiring the establishment of strong and stable governments providing the necessary leadership to steer the countries towards development. Therefore, one-party states emerged as a popular form of government in Africa during this period with many countries adopting this system of governance as a means of consolidating power and promoting national unity. One of the main reasons for the emergence of this political system and structure was the desire to promote national unity and prevent ethnic and regional divisions (Widner, 2023; Ngasongwa, 1992). Many African countries are made up of diverse ethnic and linguistic groups often leading to tensions and conflicts. The political states employed one party as a sense of national identity and loyalty to the ruling party, portrayed as the embodiment of the nation. Another factor contributing to the emergence of this political system was the desire to promote economic development. Many African countries faced with the challenge of developing and building their economies from scratch perceived the one-party system as a modus operandi of providing the necessary stability and continuity to achieve this goal. By consolidating power under a single political party, African leaders believed they could implement long-term economic plans without the disruptions caused by frequent changes in government (Widner, 2023; Zimba, 1984).

Examples of African states that adopted the one-party system included Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya and Zambia. In Ghana, the one-party system emerged in 1964 under the Nkrumah government (Widner, 2023; Zimba, 1984). In Tanzania, the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has been in power since the country gained independence in 1961. The CCM has been credited with promoting national unity and stability, as well as implementing successful economic policies that have led to significant improvements in the standard of living of Tanzanians. In Kenya, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) was the ruling party from independence in 1963 until 2002 when it was defeated in a multi-party election (Widner, 2023; Monyani, 2018; Reuter, 1983).

During its time in power, KANU was accused of suppressing political opposition and promoting corruption, which led to widespread discontent among Kenyans. A one-party system is a political framework in which only a single or dominant party forms and controls the state affairs by forming the government. The phenomenon occurs in two folds: the activities of the opposition are completely outlawed or absent such that even the opposition parties are not allowed to participate in elections or the chances of the opposition to win power are thwarted via the application of unfavorable legal frameworks (Monyani, 2018). The institutionalization of a one-party state on the African continent in the 20<sup>th</sup> century was done through the support of the masses, especially the non-elites. One-party states favored socialism as an economic ideology for development. It was run by leaders who were the forerunners in the struggle for independence. The one-party system served as the safeguard of public ownership. Using Tanzania and Burkina Faso as cases, the paper examined the factors that contributed to the adoption of one-party as a political system as well as assessed the advantages and the demerits. The factors that led to the establishment of the one-party state in Tanzania and Burkina Faso can be grouped into socioeconomic and political reasons.

## 2. Literature Review

### 2.1. Tanzania

Tanzania is a unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar where the former is the mainland and the latter is an island. Tanganyika served as a military outpost during WWII and provided financial assistance and ammunition. Tanzania has had Dodoma as the official capital since 1974 with Dar-es-Salaam being the largest city and port (Mascarenhas *et al.*, 2023). During independence, Tanzania was a multiparty political state although the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) party formed in 1954 had political dominance in the legislature. The foundation of the TANU party to promote a one-party state was laid in the party's constitution (Glickman, 1965).

The thriving of the one-party system in Tanzania can be attributed to the post-colonial situation as the party in power, TANU, was in a position already to back executive dominance. One of the fundamental reasons that favored the establishment of a one-party state in Tanganyika Tanzania is the presence of the TANU party as a dominant party and its overwhelming control of the Assembly as it had 70 seats out of the 71 seats in the House of Assembly coupled with the popularity of its leaders specifically, Julius (Chilivumbo, 1968).

Nyerere argued that, if all were in agreement on the topmost priorities of society, it is prudent to have all representatives cooperating to achieve these societal needs instead of jockeying for political advantages and that the nature of political parties in Africa is different from those of Europe by describing European-American parties as:

*“... came into being as the result of existing social and economic divisions—the second party being formed to challenge the monopoly of political power by some aristocratic or capitalist group. Our own parties had a very different origin. They were not formed to challenge any ruling group of our own people; they were formed to challenge the foreigners who ruled over us” (Nyerere, 1967).*

The adoption of the one-party system in Tanzania had been given lots of further theoretical justifications and such justifications include the reluctance of colonial administrators to accept the parliamentary process; African leaders viewing chiefs as power rivals and being reluctant to depend on them to govern even in their territories; Tanganyika had more than 120 ethnic-nationalities (Quigley, 1991). The elimination of political competition and the banning of opposition parties did not mean the end of democracy and the establishment of a one-party state was to revive traditional African life. Opposition based on multiparty competition was but a luxury in African conditions (Gupta, 1975).

Additionally, before the commencement of one-party state rule in Tanzania in 1965, the administration of President Nyerere sought to suppress nationality division by abolishing the institution of chieftaincy in 1963. However, in terms of nationality, the existence of the over hundred nationalities could not pose threats as none could dominate even when a few were more advanced economically as well as proposed the outlawing of other parties, forcing the Minister of Justice, Chief Abdallah Fundikira to resign and a TANU member to resign as a form of protest (Quigley 1991). With the highly differentiated bases, it was not challenging to argue that, opposition groups would aggravate tribalistic tensions, hence, derailing the efforts of national integration (Gupta, 1975).

Aside from the socio-political factors that helped in establishing one-party in Tanzania, there were economic factors too. The lack of adequate resources and manpower required the mobilization of national resources fully in contrast to spending on drabs and drabs in fruitless tiffs among the political parties. The economic challenges proved beneficial to the political development of a one-party state for the limited resources of a peasant-based economy helped to keep in check social cleavages based on conflicting economic interests (Gupta, 1975).

Strictly speaking, the journey to transform Tanzania into a one-party dictatorship began with President Nyerere advocating the idea that the establishment of a one-party dictatorship would give way to a true form of democracy. It would strengthen Congress and make its debates as lively as those of national party leaders, end the artificial division between civil servants and civil servants (politicians) and house all disparate groups in a unified party organization (Tordoff, 1967).

## 2.2. Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso is a former French colony and was formerly known as Upper Volta from the period of 1960 to 1984. The country has witnessed five different coups between its political independence and 2014. The country attained its political independence in 1960 after the French claimed the area in 1896 from the Mossi. The Mossi resisted the domination of the French and captured the capital, Ouagadougou in 1901. Upper Volta as a colony was created in 1919, but it was dismembered and reconstituted until the present borders were recognized in 1947 (Bureau of African Affairs, 2008). The state of Burkina Faso occupies an extensive plateau and is a landlocked country. The state of Burkina Faso is bordered by Mali (north); Niger (northeast); Benin (southeast) and Ghana, Togo and Ivory Coast (south). The nation of Burkina Faso is predominantly composed of Mossi, Fulani and Gurma who comprise more than 70% of the total population. Aside from these ethnicities, there exist other minority ethnic groupings like Bobo, Gurunsi, Senufo, Busansi and others. Religiously, the state is dominated by Muslims (61.6%), Roman Catholics (23.2%) and Protestants (7.6%) (Echenberg, Guiguemde, Pierre., and Deschamps, 2023).

The renaming of Upper Volta to its current name, Burkina Faso occurred under the regime of Thomas Sankara. The name, Burkina Faso has its roots in the Mossi language which means “Land of the Upright” and has Ouagadougou as its national capital. Most of the people in Burkina abode in the countryside with a youthful population of about 71.4% (0-29 years). Burkina Faso’s political development since independence before 1984 can be described as periodic episodes of attempts to introduce despotic tendencies on the one hand and democratic rule on the other with the military playing an integral role. The achievement of political independence by the Upper Volta was followed by a referendum on a draft constitution and parliamentary elections in 1959. The interim constitution introduced a presidential system, and Maurice Yaméogo was elected as the first head of state (president). Following the election of President Yaméogo in 1959, several opposition leaders from the Party for Reorganization of Africa (PRA) aligned with Yaméogo’s African Democratic Assembly (RDA) shortly after the 1959 election. A ban on other political parties took place in the Upper Volta, and in the early 1960s, Yaméogo’s Union of Voltaic Democrats (UDV- RDA) became the main political institution for institutionalizing the one-party state (Nohlen at al., 1999).

## 3. Method

The research relied on the use of both primary and secondary sources with most primary sources being archival in nature. The methodological approach is one of chronology and themes. The paper used a ‘multidimensional’ research philosophy by combining positivist and pragmatist research philosophies. The positivist research philosophy asserts

that historical facts must be understood objectively by detaching oneself from their personal values, and biases and working independently while the pragmatist research philosophy advocates for the facts. This approach uses both the positivist paradigm and the critical postmodernism paradigm. The positivist paradigm is focused on unearthing truth and presenting it by empirical means, although it doesn't encourage subjectivity in interpreting social realities. The critical postmodernism paradigm asserts that social reality is historically constituted and it is produced and reproduced by people. This paradigm questions the status quo and focuses on the differences and constraints in the studied countries through the use of both positivist and interpretive paradigms (Vorster 1984; Van Merriënboer and De Bruin 2014).

#### 4. Discussion and Findings

With the foundation of a one-party state in Tanzania, Nyerere's position was legitimized and he felt free to carry out his socioeconomic changes; so, in January 1967, he proposed extensive reforms, the "Arusha Declaration," at a conference at TANU. These reforms included an emphasis on rural and agricultural development through the construction of Ujamma or cooperative villages; the abolition of trade unions, which forced workers to organize through a single union, TANU controlled; a new education policy to implement and reflect socialist values and prepare students for a rural existence; nationalization of all private commercial banks and firms as a means of bringing the economy into people's ownership and control; and development telecommunications, and the creation of a new culture based on elements of tribal expression was intended to help develop the same kind of national identification that Tanzanians allegedly had for their tribal homeland (Tordoff, 1967).

With the establishment of Tanzania as a one-party dictatorship under the new constitution, the state of Tanzania began nationalizing economic organizations. The TANU Party developed norms for all TANU leaders, and the government and political party institutions such as appointees shouldn't own stocks, accept the management of private enterprises, and earn more than their salary, own a house, and rent it out to others. The nationalization of the economy under President Nyerere received positive support, mainly because the peasant community supported the government. There were no persistent interests in tribal areas or urban areas to oppose their development plans. Wage earners and trade unions enthusiastically supported the Arusha Declaration, and the decision to hold an open competition among TANU members to prevent organized factions from threatening the party's survival was all a sign of one-party rule in Tanzania (Tordoff, 1967).

Nonetheless, as time evolved, new measures were put in place giving the TANU Party supremacy, especially when the Tanzanian Constitution was amended officially to enshrine party supremacy and stated: "*all political activities in Tanzania shall be carried out by, or under the auspices of the party (TANU or ASP) and that the function of all organs of the state of the United Republic shall be performed under the auspices of the party* (Ngasongwa 1992). A decade after the introduction and implementation of the Arusha Declaration, President Nyerere argued that Tanzania was neither socialist nor self-reliant and the nature of exploitation had changed but not eliminated as there existed great inequalities among citizens; democracy practised in Tanzania was imperfect as many of the citizens still were poor and too many of them suffer from the indignities of preventable diseases and ignorance (Nyerere, 1977).

Additionally, Tanzania after the implementation of the Ujamma and Arusha Declaration with its one-party statism, the state was still predominantly economically dependent on the whimsies of the weather, and upon economic and political decisions taken without the people of Tanzania's participation and consent. The Administration of Nyerere further argued that mistakes were committed in the first decade of the Arusha Declaration, but it had learned from the mistakes and gained some experiences to make good progress toward the provision of basic health, education, and transportation facilities for all (Nyerere 1977).

While the administration made errors, in the first ten years of the Arusha Declaration, it made also significant strides, especially after the nationalization. For instance, the National Bank of Commerce retained net profits of Shs. 557.3 million leading Nyerere to argue that "*a 'mrija' through which our little wealth was being sucked, has been cut*" as well as Tanzania exercised its right to decide for itself what to build and demand its priorities as it used its limited resources to create industries to serve the needs of the indigenes and such industries included the manufacturing of goods as farm implements, shoes, tobacco, tyres, radios, fertilizers, batteries, cement works, bicycles, printing plants, among others (Nyerere 1977).

In 1975, a decade after establishing Tanzania as a One-Party State, it had eight (8) textile mills capable of producing more than 80 million sq. m of cloth and a sisal carpet factory as the phase of industrialization was geared towards increasing the foreign exchange earning power of the newly independent state. In the area of education, the state saw the creation of secondary and post-secondary educational facilities and in 1974, the State embarked on universal primary education for all children by the end of 1977.

Between 1967 and 1975, enrolment had increased from 825,000 pupils to 1,532,000 pupils at the level of primary education representing about an 86% jump; in 1976, six hundred and sixty-five thousand two hundred and sixty-one (665, 261) children entered the school for the first time compared to a total of 184,537 children who entered in 1967 also showing an increase of about 261% while 1.9 million people passed the literacy test at the 3<sup>rd</sup> or 4<sup>th</sup> level implying that they can read, write or do simple sums with ease. In the area of health, between the periods of 1967 and 1976, the state saw an increment of rural health centers in operation from 42 in 1967 to 152; 610 maternal and child-care clinics were constructed; life expectancy increased to about 47 and infant mortality declined from 161 per 1000 births in 1967 to about 152 per 1000 (Nyerere, 1977).

One-party statism in Tanzania ended in Tanzania in February 1992 as a Presidential Commission on a One-Party or Multi-Party-Political System was established in March 1991. Even though the Commission found that “the majority (80%) of Tanzanians who gave their views to it wanted the one-party system to continue in Tanzania”, the Commission argued that there existed a significant percentage of citizens wanting multipartyism hence recommended for the state to end one-party system (Ngasongwa, 1992).

The one-party state of post-independent Upper Volta lasted for a period of about six years and the military captured power. Yaméogo was overthrown due to austerity measures implemented by his administration. The austerity measures included massive taxation resulting in mass demonstrations and strikes from trade unions coupled with Yaméogo’s lack of support from the Catholic Church due to his divorce and remarriage (Harsch, 1998; Nohlen *et al.*, 1999). The first republic of Upper Volta ended with the overthrow of President Maurice Yaméogo.

On January 3, 1966, Lieutenant Colonel Abubakar Sangoulé Lamizana overthrew President Yaméogo’s government and established a military government. In his speech, Lieutenant-Colonel Lamizana claimed that within four years the Armed Forces would form an interim government and liberalize the Voltaian political system. The ban on political parties was lifted in November 1969 and political parties resumed their activities. In 1970, the second Republican Constitution was enacted, which provided for the institutionalization of a semi-presidential system. In December of the same year, the Upper Volta introduced its first competitive electoral system since independence, with the Voltaic Democratic Union-African Democratic Union (UDV-RDA) winning two-thirds (67.7%) of the parliamentary seats (Nohlen *et al.*, 1999).

However, after four years of multiparty democracy in Upper Volta, a power tussle between the parliamentary speaker, Joseph Ouédraogo and the prime minister, Gérard Kango Ouédraogo led to President Lamizana suspending the constitution and dissolving parliament. This coup of August 2, 1974, was not socially accepted and lacked a broad social consensus. Hence, on November 27, 1977, the military junta of Lieutenant-Colonel Lamizana re-established democracy via a referendum (Nohlen *et al.*, 1999). Nonetheless, three years later, the third attempt to democratize Upper Volta failed again, chiefly due to personal conflicts between ambitious political leaders and officers and the messy economic situation at the time.

Domestic political and economic challenges faced by the Upper Volta led to several military uprisings and the conquest of the state, and on August 4, 1983, Thomas Sankara captured the political power of the state ushering in a new regime, Conseil National de la Revolution (CNR) (Abdoulie, 2017). As the Head of State of Upper Volta, Sankara established a ‘democratic and popular revolution’. The day after the coup, the CNR issued an order reorganizing the country into 30 provinces. On August 9, Sankara dismissed the Ouédraogo cabinet and asked senior officials to take over the ministry until new ministers were appointed (Reuters, 1983).

As the leader of the CNR, Sankara proclaimed the revolution [August 1983], which was highly critical of elite privilege, and sought to introduce various forms of regulation of business to implement policies that would bring wealth and health to the poor masses, especially those in rural areas. Radical change cannot occur without a certain amount of insanity born out of nonconformity, the courage to move away from old conventions, the courage to invest in the future and the dare to invent the future (Praire, 2007). He opposed the growing external debt of Africa and urged the regional leaders to block payments en masse while calling for the development of Pan-Africanism not fundamentally at the top, but above all among the peoples of the continent (Nyarko, 2023; Louw, 2022).

Sankara established the Committees for the Defense of the Revolutionary (CDRs), a body that encompassed the people as a way to allow them to become truly self-governing and virtuosos of their futures as well as to extend their control over every aspect of the state. The rationale of the CDRs was to help spread the message of the revolution and implement the regime’s goals. He joined the proletariats (peasants, and workers) and the youth to execute the deep-going socioeconomic programs that limited the prerogatives and rights of the wealthy traders and aristocrats (Nyarko, 2023; Sawadogo, 1984; Yonaba, 1997).

In May 1984, Sankara executed some military officers for an alleged coup to overthrow his regime as well as renamed the country from Upper Volta to Burkina Faso. His regime cultivated friendly relations with states such as Ghana, Ivory

Coast, Libya, Albania and the Soviet Union. The Sankaran administration imposed 'strict budgetary rigour' successfully reducing the budget deficit from FCFA 24.5 bn to FCFA 4.5 bn by 1985; although in 1986 and 1987, the deficit had risen to FCFA 12.4bn still better than what the Sankaran regime inherited. The feat was achieved through a 25-50% cut in salaries, benefits and bonuses paid to public sector employees, the elimination of "ghost names" from salaries, significant cuts in tips for senior officials, extensive collection measures of taxes and customs duties, and a very intensive crackdown on high-level corruption and administrative self-aggrandizement (Harsch, 1998; World Bank, 1989).

The People's Revolutionary Court has tried and convicted hundreds of former politicians and technocrats who have amassed billions of francs through the recovery of embezzled funds and has prevented further outflows of limited state funds. The regime increased investment in education, health care, and basic infrastructure, relying in part on government redistribution, local funding, and human resources from public mobilization. For example, the railway line from Abidjan to Ouagadougou was extended 100 kilometers further into north-eastern Burkina Faso, relying almost entirely on public labor mobilization (Englebert, 1996; Asche, 1994).

By January 1986, the regime of Thomas Sankara had established over 7460 primary healthcare centers, vaccinating about two million children, reducing rural illiteracy and expanding social welfare services with social programs concentrating on housing, employment, water, child assistance and family planning. The development of Burkina Faso under Sankara hinged on social organizations and self-help projects. This proposition of executing development led to the establishment of 166 new civil associations and peasant associations increasing from 5,120 to 15,910 from 1983-1987. The Sankaran administration between 1983-1987 changed the social and political dimensions of the state as women got appointed to cabinet positions, news broadcasted in local dialects such as Mossi, Bobo, Silmi- Mossi, Peulh, Gourounsi and shunned the broadcast of news in French; adult literacy introduced and the caste system in the Burkinabé society challenged as the CDRs created new opportunities for those of the low castes to assert themselves (Rédaction AfricaNews, 2022; Harsch, 2013; Rouamba and Descarries, 2010).

However, on October 15, 1987, Blaise Compaoré overthrew the government of Thomas Sankara in a bloody coup. The latter along with twelve others were assassinated in the coup. Sankara was lured to his demise at a meeting of the National Revolutionary Council, shot seven times in his chest. Sankara and these twelve comrades were shot outside the Conseil d' Entente, the central parliament where the presidential position was immediately taken by his right-hand man and a close friend, Captain Blaise Compaoré and branded Sankara as a traitor to the "Popular Revolution" of August 4, 1983 (Wilkins, 1989; BBC, 2022).

The assassination was executed without the orders of Compaoré as the perpetrators acted to prevent Sankara from carrying out a plot to kill the former. The bodies of Sankara and the twelve comrades were thrown into a common grave following a curfew in the pre-dawn of October 16 and covered with a light layer of dirt; however, on October 17, 1987, the remains were reburied in separate graves. The Compaoré regime banned all Requiem Masses for Sankara, closed down schools due to students throwing stones at the emissaries of the new administration as well and attacked some of the eccentric policies of Sankara such as the abolishment of rents and civil servants wear of tunics made of homespun cotton (Brooke, 1987). After the capture of state power by Compaoré in 1987, he was ousted on October 31, 2014, by the streets for wanting to alter the constitution which gave a term limit to remain in power (African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1999). His regime ended the one-party state experienced in Burkina Faso.

The Compaoré administration established the Popular Front immediately after the coup and held its first national congress where a committee was constituted to draft a new constitution emphasizing political pluralism (Hilgers, 2010). The Compaoré regime re-established links with its former colonialists, reinstated dismissed civil and public servants, co-opted politicians from the old political parties by offering them positions in the new regime, lifted restrictions on trade empowering trade unions and allowing traditional rulers to play significant roles in the governance of the state (Harsch, 2013).

The first few years of the Compaoré's regime saw the continuation of some of the public projects initiated by the Sankaran regime but were later abandoned. The abandonment of the Sankaran fiscal disciplinary measures led to a decline in tax revenues, a revival of bureaucratic corruption and nepotism, greater losses of some state-owned enterprises and the accumulation of payment arrears of nearly \$300 mn (domestic and external). Expenditures on urban services, salaries and public services escalated; national income sharply declined due to the sharp decline in remittances culminating in an intensified economic quagmire. Between 1986-1990, remittances from Burkinabé migrants had slopped downwards from 128% in 1986 to about 54% in 1990 (Harsch, 2013).

The situation of economic quagmire caused the propounding of the Compaoré regime to seek assistance from the Bretton Woods. The regime requested IMF assistance for an agricultural loan in mid-1988, although the agreement was

actualized in March 1991. The performance of Burkina Faso between 1981-91 influenced the World Bank to judge Burkina Faso to have had a 'large improvement' in macroeconomic policies and expressed satisfaction with the state's reform efforts and overall performance of the economy. The World Bank asserted Burkina Faso since mid-1984, had implemented several adjustment measures [which] are beginning to bear fruits, hence rated the state among top reformers on the African continent based on policies adopted over 1987-91 under Compaoré (World Bank, 1989, 1994).

However, the important new public projects became the first casualties of the adjustment. When the National Planning Council announced its five-year development, planned investments fell from the previous draft of \$3.6 bn and shrunk to \$1.8 bn. A rail line expansion project initiated by Sankara and temporarily continued by Compaoré was shelved at the request of the IMF. Since then, IMF and World Bank public investment in infrastructure and other areas has improved somewhat (Harsch, 2013; Jones and Kiguel, 1994). During the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Burkina Faso began the process of democratization, with the gradual freedom of the military government through the adoption of a multi-party constitution promulgated by Blaise Compaoré in a referendum in June 1991 and the legalization of opposition parties started to transform. Presidential, parliamentary and local elections were held in December 1991, May 1992 and February 1995 (Santiso and Loada 2003; Blanc *et al.*, 1994).

After the referendum of 1991, Burkina Faso returned to democratic rule where Compaoré run unopposed as president and transitioned from a military junta with military garb to civilian rule. During this same period, Burkina Faso signed its historic structural adjustment program with the Bretton Wood institution. The opposition boycotted the elections as a result of his refusal to consent to calls to organize a sovereign National Conference. Compaoré won the elections by winning 750,146 out of the total vote cast of 868,038 representing 86.4% (Santiso and Loada, 2003; Nohlen *et al.*, 1999).

## 5. Conclusion

The emergence of one-party states in Tanzania or Burkina Faso was a response to the challenges of nation-building and economic development faced by these countries after gaining independence. In Tanzania, the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has been in power since the country gained independence in 1961. The CCM has been credited with promoting national unity and stability, as well as implementing successful economic policies that have led to significant improvements in the standard of living of Tanzanians. Similarly, in Burkina Faso, the ruling party, the Popular Democratic Party of Burkina (PDP-PS), was in power from 1987 until 1991 when it was overthrown in a popular uprising. During its time in power, the PDP-PS was credited with promoting national unity and stability, as well as implementing successful economic policies that led to significant improvements in the standard of living of Burkinabes.

However, the one-party system in Tanzania or Burkina Faso was not without its challenges. In Tanzania, the CCM was accused of suppressing political opposition and promoting corruption, which led to widespread discontent among Tanzanians. Similarly, in Burkina Faso, the PDP-PS was accused of suppressing political opposition and promoting corruption, which led to widespread discontent among Burkinabes. These challenges ultimately led to the downfall of the one-party system in Burkina Faso, as the PDP-PS was overthrown in a popular uprising in 1991. In Tanzania, however, the CCM remains in power to this day, although it has faced increasing pressure to adopt a more democratic and pluralistic system of government. While these goals were achieved to some extent, the one-party system was also characterized by suppressing political opposition and promoting corruption. The downfall of the one-party system in Burkina Faso serves as a cautionary tale of the dangers of consolidating power under one party. At the same time, the continued dominance of the CCM in Tanzania highlights the challenges of transitioning to a more democratic and pluralistic system of government. Ultimately, the success or failure of the one-party system in Tanzania or Burkina Faso depends on the ability of these countries to balance the need for stability and continuity with the need for political pluralism and democratic governance.

The emergence of one-party states in Africa was through constitutional means and massive support from the citizens purposely to advance the course of the newly independent political states, ensuring there are no tribalistic tensions and unnecessary bickering which may or could jeopardize the agenda of development and was largely influenced by the desire to promote national unity and economic development. While some African states were successful in achieving these goals, others were accused of suppressing political opposition and promoting corruption. The one-party system remains a controversial form of government in Africa, with many states now adopting multi-party systems to promote liberal Western democracy and political pluralism.

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